Measuring Organizational Performance in Strategic Human Resource Management: Looking Beyond the Lamppost

A major challenge for Strategic Human Resource Management research in the next decade will be to establish a clear, coherent and consistent construct for organizational performance. This paper describes the variety of measures used in current empirical research linking human resource management and organizational performance. Implications for future research are discussed amidst the challenges of construct definition, divergent stakeholder criteria and the temporal dynamics of performance. A model for performance information markets to address these challenges is introduced. The model uses a multi-dimensional weighted performance measurement system and a free information flow exchange mechanism for determining performance achievement criteria

Measuring Organizational Performance in Strategic Human Resource Management: Problems and Prospects

A major challenge for Strategic Human Resource Management research in the next decade will be to establish a clear, coherent and consistent construct for organizational performance. This paper describes the variety of measures used in current empirical research linking human resource management and organizational performance. Implications for future research are discussed amidst the challenges of construct definition, divergent stakeholder criteria and the temporal dynamics of performance. The concept of performance information markets that addresses these challenges is proposed as a framework for the application of multi-dimensional weighted performance measurement systems

Knowledge, People, and Risk

NASA's mandate is to take risks to got into space while applying its best knowledge. NASA's knowledge is the result of scientific insights from research, engineering wisdom from experience, project management skills, safety and team consciousness and institutional support and collaboration. This presentation highlights NASA's organizational knowledge, communication and growth efforts

Characteristics of Duplicate Records in OCLC's Online Union Catalog

Duplicate records in the Online Union Catalog of the OCLC Online Computer Library Center, Inc., were analyzed. Bibliographic elements comprise information found in one or more fields of a bibliographic record; e.g., the author element comprises the main and added author entry fields. Bibliographic element mismatches in duplicate record pairs were considered relative to the number of records in which each element was present. When a single element differed in a duplicate record pair, that element was most often publication date. This finding shows that a difference in the date of publication is not a reliable indicator of bibliographic uniqueness. General cataloging and data entry patterns such as variations in title transcription and form of name, typographical errors, mistagged fields, misplaced subfield codes, omissions, and inconsistencies between fixed and variable fields often caused records that were duplicates to appear different. These factors can make it extremely difficult for catalogers to retrieve existing bibliographic records and thus avoid creating duplicate records. They also prevent duplicate detection algorithms used for tape-loading records from achieving desired results. An awareness of particularly problematic bibliographic elements and general factors contributing to the creation of duplicate records should help catalogers identify and accept existing records more often. This awareness should also help to direct system designers in their development of more sensitive algorithms to be used for tape loading. The resulting general reduction in the number of duplicate records in union catalogs will be a major step toward increased cataloger productivity, user satisfaction, and overall online database quality

The geometry of reaction norms yields insights on classical fitness functions for Great Lakes salmon.

Life history theory examines how characteristics of organisms, such as age and size at maturity, may vary through natural selection as evolutionary responses that optimize fitness. Here we ask how predictions of age and size at maturity differ for the three classical fitness functions-intrinsic rate of natural increase r, net reproductive rate R0, and reproductive value Vx-for semelparous species. We show that different choices of fitness functions can lead to very different predictions of species behavior. In one's efforts to understand an organism's behavior and to develop effective conservation and management policies, the choice of fitness function matters. The central ingredient of our approach is the maturation reaction norm (MRN), which describes how optimal age and size at maturation vary with growth rate or mortality rate. We develop a practical geometric construction of MRNs that allows us to include different growth functions (linear growth and nonlinear von Bertalanffy growth in length) and develop two-dimensional MRNs useful for quantifying growth-mortality trade-offs. We relate our approach to Beverton-Holt life history invariants and to the Stearns-Koella categorization of MRNs. We conclude with a detailed discussion of life history parameters for Great Lakes Chinook Salmon and demonstrate that age and size at maturity are consistent with predictions using R0 (but not r or Vx) as the underlying fitness function

Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA

After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future

Valuing Rigor in the Risk Management Process

NASA, as an organization, takes risk management (RM) seriously, and for most projects, the risk management process is exemplar. There can be challenges, though, with defining RM processes. For example, many different risk analysis methodologies are available, they can be applied with varying degrees of rigor, and they can have different value depending on how projects use them. In particular, risk analysis methodologies vary considerably in the level of quantitative detail, with more probabilistic techniques encouraged in some situations. We discussed these processes and methodologies with ten project managers (PM) at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Our intent was not to prove with some level of statistical significance that some are more helpful than others, but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects are identifying, and thinking, about risks. This paper describes some of the available risk processes and methodologies, and provides some insights about the benefits that can gained from their use. We provide an in-depth discussion of one quantitative methodology, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), and conclude with a few insights from observed best practices